Evidence Law

Sukhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh

(1999) 9 SCC 507

Facts

Nakkal was shot and injured in the morning near agricultural land.
The prosecution alleged that Sukhar, who was Nakkal’s nephew, had fired the shot.
There was an existing land dispute and hostility between them.
Pitam, examined as PW 2, heard the sound of firing and immediately ran towards the place.
He saw Nakkal lying injured on the ground.
When Pitam asked what had happened, Nakkal stated that Sukhar had shot him.
Nakkal went to the police station and made a statement which was treated as the FIR.
Nakkal later died while the trial was pending.
However, the prosecution did not prove:
when he died;
why he died; or
whether his death was connected with the gunshot injury.
His FIR and police statement could therefore not be admitted as dying declarations.
The prosecution principally relied upon Pitam’s testimony about what Nakkal told him immediately after the shooting.
Pitam admitted that:
he had prior hostility with Sukhar;
more than twenty people had gathered; and
none of the other persons was examined to confirm Nakkal’s statement.

Whether Nakkal’s immediate statement to Pitam was admissible under Section 6 as res gestae.
Whether an admissible res gestae statement was sufficiently reliable to support conviction without corroboration.

Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act corresponds to Section 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam.
A hearsay statement may become admissible as res gestae where it is:
spontaneous;
almost contemporaneous with the event;
made while the influence of the occurrence continues; and
so closely connected with the event as to form part of the same transaction.
There must be no interval sufficient for fabrication.
Admissibility and evidentiary weight are separate questions.
Even where a statement is legally admissible, the court must consider:
the credibility of the witness reporting it;
possible hostility or motive;
consistency;
available corroboration; and
the prosecution’s failure to call natural witnesses.

Pitam heard the shot and immediately went to the place of occurrence.
He did not witness the actual firing, but he found Nakkal still lying injured.
The question and answer occurred before the excitement and physical effects of the attack had ended.
The Court therefore considered Nakkal’s words a natural and spontaneous reaction to the shooting.
There was no significant break in time or circumstances.
The statement was accordingly admissible under Section 6.
The Court then carefully separated admissibility from reliability.
Pitam was admittedly hostile towards Sukhar because of earlier disputes.
This did not make his testimony automatically inadmissible, but it required careful scrutiny.
More importantly, Pitam stated that over twenty persons were present and heard Nakkal repeatedly name the assailant.
The prosecution offered no satisfactory explanation for examining none of those independent persons.
There was:
no other eyewitness;
no recovery sufficiently corroborating the account;
no reliable dying declaration;
no independent circumstance confirming Pitam’s version.
Therefore, although Nakkal’s statement qualified as res gestae, the testimony through which it reached the court was not of such unimpeachable quality that conviction could safely rest on it alone.
The case demonstrates that an exception to the hearsay rule only permits the court to consider the statement.
It does not compel the court to believe it or treat it as sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court held that Nakkal’s immediate statement identifying Sukhar was admissible under Section 6.
However, Pitam was an inimical witness and his account lacked any independent corroboration despite the presence of numerous available witnesses.
The evidence was therefore too shaky and unreliable to sustain conviction by itself.
The conviction and sentence were set aside and Sukhar was acquitted.
The decision is particularly important for distinguishing legal admissibility from factual reliability and sufficiency.